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Hearing: Strengthening and Streamlining Prudential Bank Supervision 
August 4, 2009 
U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Shelby, and other members of the committee. 
 
Before the final history of the financial crisis is written, I'm certain that supervisory 
shortcomings in all kinds and sizes of institutions -- financial institutions will have been 
revealed. 
 
The crisis has also shown that the framework for prudential supervision and regulation has not 
kept pace with changes in the structure, activities and interrelationships of the financial sector. In 
my prepared testimony, I have suggested and tried to elaborate the elements of an effective 
framework for prudential supervision, including a number of recommendations for legislative 
action. 
 
Knowing of your time constraints this morning, let me confine these introductory remarks to 
three quick points. 
 
First, prudential supervision must be required for all systemically important institutions. It is 
noteworthy that a number of the firms at the heart of the crisis had not been subject to mandatory 
prudential supervision of any sort. Improving the quality of supervision will fall short of 
realizing the maximum potential gains for financial stability if important institutions can escape 
the rules and requirements associated with the supervisory process. 
 
Second, there must be effective supervision of the companies that own insured depository 
institutions, a task that is distinct from the supervision of the banks themselves. Large 
organizations increasingly manage their businesses on an integrated basis with little regard for 
the corporate boundaries that typically define the jurisdiction of individual functional 
supervisors. There is need for close scrutiny of the linkages between the banks and other 
affiliates within a holding company, not just straightforward financial or contractual ties, but also 
managerial, operational and reputational linkages. The premise of so-called functional 
regulation, that risks within a diversified organization can be successfully evaluated and 
controlled through supervision within each individual firm, has been belied by the experience of 
the financial crisis. 
 
Third, it is important to emphasize that much of what needs to be done to improve and adapt our 
system of prudential supervision lies within the existing authorities of the agencies represented at 
this table. Together, we have acted to shut down the practice of converting charters in order to 
escape enforcement actions or adverse supervisory ratings. We are working together in 
international fora to assure that all internationally active financial institutions are subject to 
effective regulation. The Federal Reserve is adjusting its approach to prudential supervision, 
particularly of the largest banking organizations. 
 
Building on the experience of the unprecedented Supervisory Capital Assessment Program, or 
SCAP, we are expanding our use of horizontal examinations to assess key operations, risks and 
risk management activities of large institutions. We are creating an enhanced quantitative 
surveillance mechanism that will draw on a multidisciplinary group of economists and other 
experts to create and evaluate scenarios across large firms. 
 
These top-down analyses will provide an independent supervisory perspective on the bottom-up 
work of supervisory teams. The two perspectives will be joined in a well-coordinated process 
involving both the supervisory teams and Washington staff. 
 
Thank you all for your attention. I look forward to discussing both agency and congressional 
initiatives to strengthen further our prudential supervisory system. 
